Towards a Practical Survivable Intrusion Tolerant Replication System

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Abstract—The increasing number of cyber attacks against critical infrastructures, which typically require large state and long system lifetimes, necessitates the design of systems that are able to work correctly even if part of them is compromised.

We present the first practical survivable intrusion tolerant replication system, which defends across space and time using compiler-based diversity and proactive recovery, respectively. Our system supports large-state applications, and utilizes the Prime BFT protocol (providing performance guarantees under attack) with a compiler-based diversification engine. We devise a novel theoretical model that computes how resilient the system is over its lifetime based on the rejuvenation rate and the number of replicas.

This model shows that we can achieve a confidence in the system of 95% over 30 years even when we transfer a state of 1 terabyte after each rejuvenation.

I. INTRODUCTION

Critical infrastructures such as financial, transport, or SCADA systems play an important role in everyday life. In this world, availability, reliability, and security are paramount. However, it is well known that exploits exist in software architectures and that attackers use these exploits to compromise systems. As a consequence, critical systems must be built to tolerate intrusions: they need to support consistent, large state across the infrastructure, employing algorithms that guarantee correct distributed operation over long system lifetimes even in the face of intrusions, where part of the infrastructure is controlled by the adversary.

To this end, Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocols (e.g. [1]) can be considered a building block for the design of intrusion tolerant systems, because they are able to work correctly even if $f$ out of $3f+1$ replicas behave in an arbitrary manner. However, BFT protocols alone do not provide a solid basis for the construction of intrusion tolerant replication systems with long lifetime (e.g. years): if a smart attacker is able to compromise $f$ replicas, it is likely that with time he will be able to compromise the $f+1^{th}$ replica, enabling the attacker to cause inconsistencies. This is particularly true if all the replicas are identical, as is common in real-world deployments, because an identical attack surface allows an attacker to successfully compromise all the replicas in the system with the same attack. As such, it is important to diversify replicas as much as possible [2]–[4]. We refer to this approach as defending the system across space.

However, defense across space only increases the attacker’s workload linearly by requiring the attacker to develop $f+1$ distinct attacks. The attacker can still spend the time to develop these attacks, especially if the system is long-lived. Hence, periodic rejuvenation of replicas is necessary to clean potentially undetected intrusions. The rejuvenated replica should restart as non-compromised to ensure any intrusion is cleaned, and should be diverse from all currently and previously existing replicas to ensure that the attacker has no advantage of prior knowledge. This forces the attacker to act quickly, otherwise any progress he or she has made in compromising system components will be undone. We refer to this approach as defending the system across time. Some of the current approaches in the field of intrusion tolerant systems [1], [5], [6] offer weak solutions to defend systems across space and time: they either do not diversify replicas after rejuvenation, or they use coarse-grained diversity (e.g. at the operating system level) where the strength of such a system is limited by the small number of different copies available.

Practical deployments of proactive rejuvenation raise the issue of how often to refresh replicas in order to maintain system correctness over its lifetime. Rejuvenating too often can reduce system availability, limit the size of the replicated state, and incur unnecessary overhead. In contrast, rejuvenating too infrequently can increase the likelihood that the attacker will succeed.

In this paper, we present the first practical survivable intrusion tolerant replication system that provides defense across space and time, a term first used in [7]. Our main contributions are:

- The first proactive recovery protocol that supports large state. We devise two novel state transfer strategies: one that prioritizes fast data retrieval and one that minimizes bandwidth usage, which can be used to restart a replica from a clean state;
- A theoretical model that computes the resiliency of the system over its lifetime (e.g. 30 years) based on the rejuvenation rate, the number of replicas, and the strength of a single replica; and
- The first integration of subsystems that support the assump-
tions of a practical survivable data replication system: the Prime BFT protocol [8], which ensures performance guarantees even while under attack, and that recently has been integrated into the Siemens corporation commercial SCADA product for the power grid [9]; and the MultiCompiler [10] that produces different versions of the system, such that no two versions present an identical attack surface. This does not mean that the exploits have vanished, but rather that the attacker must craft a new attack for each replica. A new version of a replica is produced after its rejuvenation.

In this way, the system is protected unless the attacker is able to compromise more than \( f \) components in a limited amount of time (the time for the entire system to be rejuvenated). This time is chosen so that the probability the attacker will succeed is low.

In a previous work [4], Schneider et al. presented a framework that periodically rejuvenates replicas, using built-in operating system tools to generate diverse copies. In our work, we generate diverse versions of Prime replicas by augmenting the built-in operating system tools with a compiler-based diversification engine.

A theoretical model for proactive rejuvenations has also been presented in [11]. While this model applies to stateless systems, in our work we define the rejuvenation rate taking into account the size of the state that may need to be transferred and the time to transfer it.

It is worthwhile to note that proactive recovery and diversity do not protect against protocol flaws. If the protocol has a flaw that makes it vulnerable to attacks (e.g. SQL injection), then proactive recovery and diversity have no effect. In addition, proactive recovery and diversity do not protect against DDoS attacks. Handling resource exhaustion attacks is an orthogonal and complementary problem to the one described in this paper.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces Prime and software diversity. Section III presents the system model. Section IV describes the proactive recovery algorithm. Section V presents the experimental evaluation of the proposed approach. Section VI illustrates the theoretical rejuvenation model. Section VII discusses previous works, and Section VIII concludes the paper.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Prime, a BFT protocol with performance guarantees

In this paper we focus on Prime as the baseline to build a long-lived intrusion tolerant system. Unlike previous BFT protocols, Prime bounds the amount of performance degradation that can be caused by a malicious leader. To do so, Prime extends the typical pre-prepare, prepare, and commit phases for global ordering with a pre-ordering phase, where a correct replica that receives a client operation broadcasts that operation in the system together with a locally generated sequence number (see Figure 1).

If the operations injected by the leader during the pre-prepare phase do not match those in the pre-ordering phase, the leader is suspected by correct replicas and replaced. In addition, Prime replicas run a background protocol to estimate the round-trip time to each other in order to compute how fast the leader should inject client operations for global ordering. If the leader fails to respect timeliness constraints, it is suspected by correct replicas and replaced. With respect to other BFT protocols, the pre-ordering phase and the round-trip time estimation in Prime introduce a small performance hit during normal operations. However, these are necessary to monitor the behavior of the leader and replace it quickly to guarantee that even under attack the client operations introduced by correct replicas are executed within a bounded-delay that depends on the current network conditions (see Section III). This allows Prime to perform an order of magnitude better than previous BFT protocols in the presence of an attack.

B. Software diversity

Software diversity, such as N-version programming [12], [13], was originally introduced for software reliability. More recently, cheaper software diversity solutions [2], [3] (i.e. not involving humans in the loop) have been used to defend software systems from code reuse attacks, in which an attacker exploits knowledge of the code by using snippets or entire functions from the application itself to perform an attack. The goal of software diversity is to evolve programs into different but semantically identical versions, such that it is unlikely that the same attack will succeed on any two variants [14].

In this paper we use the compiler presented in [10] to diversify Prime replicas. This MultiCompiler is based on the LLVM 3.1 compiler and makes use of no-operation insertion, stack padding, shuffling the stack frames, substituting instructions for equivalent instructions, randomizing the register allocation, and randomizing instruction scheduling to obfuscate the code layout of an application. After each rejuvenation the Multi-Compiler takes the Prime bitcode, i.e. a compiler-generated intermediate representation of the source code, and a 64-bit random seed and generates a diverse copy of a Prime replica from a large entropy space. Hence, if an adversary attacks all replicas in parallel, the probability to defeat more than \( f \) replicas is low. Diversity obtainable with the MultiCompiler complements diversity obtainable at the operating system level, e.g. using different distributions or different versions of the same distribution.
III. System model and properties

The system is composed of \( n \) replicas, which run the Prime BFT protocol and communicate by exchanging messages. Replicas may suffer from Byzantine or benign faults. We characterize replicas based on their behavior:

- Correct replica: a replica that follows the algorithm, is consistent, and is not being partitioned or rejuvenated.
- Malicious (or compromised) replica: a replica that exhibits arbitrary (i.e., Byzantine) behavior not according to the algorithm.
- Crashed replica: a replica that stops working. A crashed replica can restart the application from the state on the disk.
- Rejuvenating replica: a replica that is experiencing a benign fault. In particular, even if the replica was malicious, during rejuvenation it switches to a crashed replica.
- Partitioned replica: replica that cannot communicate with at least \( \gamma \) correct replicas (see Sections III-B and III-C).

Replicas are periodically rejuvenated to clean any intrusions. A fundamental condition for success is that a correct replica completes recovery before the rejuvenation of the next replica. We define the time between two consecutive rejuvenations of any replicas as the \textit{inter-rejuvenation period}. A \textit{rejuvenation cycle} is \( n \) times the inter-rejuvenation period. In addition, we require that client operations, also referred to as updates, are not injected into the system faster than correct replicas can execute them. In this way, we ensure that a correct replica that rejuvenates eventually catches up.

All messages sent among replicas are digitally signed. We assume that digital signatures are unforgeable without knowing a replica’s private key. We also make use of a collision-resistant hash function for computing message digests. In addition, we require that each replica is equipped with a tamper-proof cryptographic material to generate and store the replica’s private key and sign messages without revealing that key. To this end, we use the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The TPM also comes with a random number generator and a computationally bounded, such that it cannot subvert the cryptographic mechanisms described above.

To guarantee \textbf{Safety} in presence of proactive recovery, a correct replica has to implement a persistent memory that survives across rejuvenations, whose content has to be validated after each rejuvenation. We require that each correct Prime replica stores on the disk all messages that it sends to or accepts from other replicas. This prevents a correct replica from sending the same message twice or accepting two different messages with the same sequence number. After rejuvenation, the replica can reload the messages into main memory.

\textbf{Property 1: Safety:} If two correct replicas execute the \( i \)th update, then these updates are identical.

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\textbf{Property 2: Network-Stability:} There is a time after which the following condition holds for a set \( S \) of at least \( 2f + 1 \) correct replicas (stable replicas): for each pair of replicas \( r \) and \( s \), there exists a value \( \text{Min Lat}(r, s) \), unknown to the replicas, such that if \( r \) sends a message to \( s \), it will arrive with a delay \( \Delta_{r,s} \), where \( \text{Min Lat}(r, s) \leq \Delta_{r,s} \leq \text{Min Lat}(r, s) \cdot K_{\text{Lat}} \), with \( K_{\text{Lat}} \) a known network-specific constant accounting for latency variability.

In those executions in which \textbf{Network-Stability} is met, Prime guarantees the following \textbf{Liveness} property.

\textbf{Property 3: Liveness:} If a stable replica initiates an update, all stable replicas eventually execute the update.

This property guarantees that if the network is sufficiently stable each update is eventually executed by all correct replicas. To meet \textbf{Liveness} we must guarantee that recovery eventually completes and partitions eventually heal. Because we require that updates are not injected into the system faster than correct replicas can execute them, we guarantee that eventually a recovering replica will catch up. The \textbf{Liveness}
property does not specify how fast the updates need to be executed. When \textsc{network-stability} is met, Prime provides a stronger performance guarantee:

**Property 4:** \textsc{bounded-delay}: There exists a time after which the latency for any update initiated by a stable replica is upper bounded.

In the presence of proactive recovery even a correct and fast leader will be eventually rejuvenated. In this case we can still guarantee \textsc{bounded-delay}, but for at most $3f$ occurrences the worst-case bound on \textsc{bounded-delay} becomes $t = 2f \cdot \alpha + \beta$, with $\alpha$ the time to detect and replace a malicious or slow leader, and $\beta$ the time for a correct replica to complete recovery. We calculate $t$ will be approximately hours for real systems with large state, with $\alpha$ dominated by $\beta$. Under normal operations (i.e. no recovery in progress), if in the presence of $f$ failures an additional replica partitions away for a while and then rejoins, we are not able to guarantee \textsc{bounded-delay} until the partitioned replica catches up. In this case we are only able to guarantee \textsc{liveness}.

**C. $n = 3f + 2k + 1$ replicas**

In this section we investigate how to reduce $t$, the worst-case bound on \textsc{bounded-delay} after the rejuvenation of the leader. We avoid waiting for the complete recovery after the rejuvenation of a correct replica by adding other replicas in the system. Specifically, we need $3f + 2k + 1$ replicas, as previously described in [5]. $k$ is the maximum number of crashed, recovering, and partitioned replicas tolerated in the presence of $f$ malicious replicas during a vulnerability window $T$. In the presence of $3f + 2k + 1$ replicas we define a partitioned replica as a replica that cannot communicate with another $\gamma = 2f + k$ correct replicas. Augmenting the number of replicas requires at least $2f + k + 1$ replicas to order updates. Hence, certificates collected during pre-ordering and ordering phases are composed of $2f + k + 1$ messages.

The definitions of \textsc{safety} and \textsc{liveness} do not change in the presence of $3f + 2k + 1$ replicas. The only difference in \textsc{network-stability} is that at any time the set $S$ of stable replicas can be populated by any $2f + k + 1$ correct replicas, i.e. the minimum number required to order updates and elect a new leader. Hence, in a system with $3f + 2k + 1$ replicas, if \textsc{network-stability} holds, we can still guarantee \textsc{bounded-delay} over the rejuvenation cycle, but for at most $3f + 2k$ occurrences the worst-case bound on \textsc{bounded-delay} becomes $t = (2f + k) \cdot \alpha$. We calculate $t$ will be subsecond for real systems with large state.

Compared to the case of $3f + 1$, in the presence of $3f + 2k + 1$ replicas we have a higher number of occurrences in which the worst-case bound on \textsc{bounded-delay} is $t$. However, the rejuvenation cycle is longer, and we also expect that the time $(2f + k) \cdot \alpha$ to settle on a correct and fast leader is much smaller than the time $\beta$ to complete recovery after the rejuvenation of a correct replica.

In addition, under normal operations (i.e. no recovery in progress), in the presence of $f$ faults we can tolerate the temporary partition of at most $k$ replicas, while still guaranteeing \textsc{bounded-delay}. Unlike the $3f + 1$ replicas case, where the protocol can ensure only \textsc{liveness}, the system does not need to wait for the partitioned replicas to catch up to also guarantee \textsc{bounded-delay}.

**IV. Proactive Recovery Algorithm**

The proactive recovery algorithm depends on a component trusted to periodically initiate proactive recovery in a round robin manner. We describe in Section V how this component can be implemented. After each rejuvenation we diversify replicas as described before. The main operations the protocol executes are:

1. **Replica rejuvenation:** the server that hosts a replica is periodically rebooted;
2. **Key replacement:** the private/public keys of the rejuvenated replica are refreshed with the help of the TPM, invalidating all previous keys that could be compromised;
3. **State validation:** we assume the presence of a database to maintain replicated state. It needs to be validated before applying new updates;
4. **State transfer:** if the state is compromised, a clean copy of the state must be transferred from the other correct replicas;
5. **Prime certificate validation:** Prime messages are persistently stored on the disk to ensure \textsc{safety} across rejuvenations. They are reloaded into main memory and validated before accepting or sending new Prime messages; and
6. **Prime certificate transfer:** if some certificate is compromised or missing, it must be retrieved from the other correct replicas.

Next, we describe each operation of the proactive recovery protocol for a system with $3f + 1$ replicas. The modifications for a system with $3f + 2k + 1$ replicas are described in Section IV-F.

**A. Replica rejuvenation**

Periodically, the trusted component that runs a proactive recovery scheduler selects one replica to rejuvenate. Each replica is equipped with a physical read-only medium (e.g. CD-ROM) that stores a clean copy of the operating system, the Prime bitcode, the MultiCompiler, and the public keys of the TPMs of the other servers. Note that periodically a system administrator can replace the operating system with the latest version, including security patches. Hence, the rejuvenated replica restarts the application from a correct version of the operating system and recompiles the Prime bitcode with the MultiCompiler, which takes as input a random seed generated by the TPM. The replica is then ready to restart Prime and execute the next steps of the proactive recovery protocol. During recovery the replica does not execute pre-ordering and ordering operations.

**B. Key replacement**

Each Prime replica has two private/public key pairs: one pair is generated by the TPM at deployment time, the other one is generated after each rejuvenation and used to sign/verify Prime messages. The private key generated by the TPM is
stored in the TPM itself and cannot be leaked or deleted unless the adversary has physical access to the system and clears the TPM internal registers (we assume the adversary has no physical access to the system). The public key is disseminated to other replicas, so they can decrypt what this TPM signs.

Private/public keys to sign/verify Prime messages, also referred to as session keys, are refreshed after rejuvenation. Indeed, a replica can be impersonated if the attacker leaks the private session key and sends it to other malicious replicas. Session key replacement is the first operation to execute. If the replica was malicious before rejuvenation, after invalidating old keys we consider that replica to be experiencing a benign fault. Specifically, the rejuvenated replica generates a new private/public session key pair; then it uses the TPM to sign a message containing the new public key. The TPM also generates and attaches a monotonically increasing sequence number to that message before signing it to avoid replay attacks. The message is then sent to all other replicas in the system.

A correct replica accepts (and appends on a file) a new key if and only if the sequence number generated by the sending TPM is higher than the sequence numbers associated with the old public session keys of the same replica. From this moment until the next rejuvenation, the recovering replica will sign all messages with the new private session key. When at least \( f + 1 \) correct replicas (at least \( 2f + 1 \) replicas in total) accept the new key, all the previous keys of the rejuvenated replica are invalid. At this point, updates injected by an impersonator and signed with the old private key cannot be ordered by Prime. To ensure that a new key reaches all correct replicas, we use a forwarding mechanism: the first time a correct replica receives a new key it propagates the message to all other replicas. Note that a correct replica accepts a message signed with the TPM if and only if it contains a new public session key. Other messages signed with the TPM that could be injected by malicious replicas are dropped.

Since old public keys may be required to decrypt older preordering and ordering messages during certificates validation (see Section IV-E), the file with session keys must be validated after rejuvenation. Because we expect this file to be small in size (e.g. 70 MB in a system with 10 replicas, a rejuvenation rate of one replica per day, and a system lifetime of 30 years), this operation is straightforward: the rejuvenated replica computes a digest of the file, and broadcasts a message to request the digest of the same file stored by other replicas. The rejuvenated replica waits for \( f + 1 \) replies with the same digest: if this value matches the one computed locally, then the file is correct. Otherwise, the replica requests the file from those \( f + 1 \) replicas one by one until it receives a file that matches the digest.

C. State validation

We assume that each Prime replica applies updates to a database. The content of the database represents the replicated state, which must be validated after rejuvenation. Correct replicas take a checkpoint of the state every \( x \) updates. This operation can be executed in several ways: modern databases allow users to take periodical snapshots using copy-on-write techniques, or dumping the database content to a text file. In addition, third party tools also allow users to execute checkpointing operation efficiently. In this work we do not specify the technique used to take a database snapshot, we only consider the output of a checkpointing operation, i.e. a blob of data. Replicas maintain \( ck \) checkpoints on the disk, with \( ck \) a parameter of the algorithm. Each checkpoint is logged in a file, which contains, for each checkpoint, the sequence number of the last executed operation and a digest of the state.

After rejuvenation and key replacement, the fresh replica reads the state at the most recent checkpoint, e.g. \( ck_t \), and computes the digest. Then, a request for the digest of \( ck_i \), together with the sequence number of the last operation executed before \( ck_i \), is sent to all other replicas. A correct replica that receives such a request replies back with the digest of that checkpoint if it has that digest, otherwise it replies with a null value (the requested checkpoint may be too old or may refer to an invalid or non existing checkpoint if the rejuvenated replica was compromised). The rejuvenated replica waits for \( f + 1 \) replies with the same sequence number and digests, or \( f + 1 \) null replies. In the former case, the replica compares the received digests with the one computed locally: if they match, the state at checkpoint \( ck_i \) is correct, otherwise state transfer is necessary. In the case of \( f + 1 \) null replies, instead, the rejuvenated replica selects from the log file an older checkpoint, e.g. \( ck_{i-1} \), and repeats the state validation process.

If the rejuvenated replica has no valid checkpoints, it broadcasts a request for the most recent checkpoint taken by other replicas. The replica waits for \( 2f + 1 \) replies and selects the checkpoint \( ck^* \) with the \( f + 1 \text{th} \) highest sequence number.

D. State transfer

In a system with a potentially large state, the state transfer mechanism must be efficient to guarantee that the recovery of a compromised replica completes as quickly as possible to allow the system to rejuvenate more often, to support the assumption that the adversary does not have enough time to compromise more than one third of the entire system. In the following, we propose two different strategies, one that prioritizes fast recovery at the cost of bandwidth overhead, and one that minimizes bandwidth usage. A system administrator can choose the strategy that best satisfies the application requirements. We logically partition the state into several data blocks of fixed size. The rejuvenated replica recovers correct state by transferring these data blocks.

1) State transfer reducing latency: The recovering replica requests a data block \( b_i \) of \( f + 1 \) replicas, while another \( f \) replicas are selected to send just a digest of that block. The recovering replica then computes a digest for each received copy of the data block until a correct copy is found, that is the one whose digest matches at least another \( f \) digests. After that, the recovering replica moves on to recover data block \( b_{i+1} \). This approach reduces the time to complete state
transfer, because each block is collected in a single round (we are guaranteed that at least one copy out of \( f + 1 \) is correct), at the cost of bandwidth overhead because each block is sent \( f + 1 \) times.

2) State transfer reducing bandwidth usage: This strategy reduces the impact of malicious replicas that try to hamper the state transfer process by using a blacklisting mechanism: when a replica is blacklisted it is not contacted anymore during state transfer. The recovering replica requests a data block \( b_i \) from one replica, while another \( f \) replicas are selected to send just a digest of that block. The recovering replica then computes the digest of the received block and compares this value with the \( f \) received digests. If they match, the data block is correct. This represents the best case: the data block is retrieved in a single round, with no bandwidth overhead (i.e. just a single copy of that block is sent). If digests do not match at least one more round is required. We propose two different variations.

a) Variant 1: An additional replica, different from the previous \( f + 1 \), is selected to send another copy of the data block. This process repeats until the recovering replica finds a correct copy of the data block (at most \( f - 1 \) times). This minimizes the bandwidth usage at the cost of additional delay. The received responses (copies of the block and digests) are also used to identify and blacklist malicious replicas that sent invalid information.

b) Variant 2: \( f \) additional replicas, different from the previous \( f + 1 \), are selected to send a copy of the data block. Then, the recovering replica has \( 2f + 1 \) responses (i.e. \( f + 1 \) blocks and \( f \) digests) and uses the same approach described in Section IV-D1 to find a valid block. In addition, these responses are also used to identify and blacklist malicious replicas that sent invalid information. This approach ensures that in at most two rounds the recovering replica finds a correct data block, optimizing latency compared with the previous variant, at the cost of a higher bandwidth overhead.

When a valid copy of the data block is found, the recovering replica moves on to recover block \( b_{i+1} \). It is worthwhile to note that the blacklisting mechanism ensures that variants 1 or 2 are executed no more that \( f - 1 \) times during a state transfer instance. Because we expect \( f \) to be much smaller than the number of data blocks, the impact of malicious replicas on state transfer is negligible.

The strategies we propose aim to efficiently retrieve a large state in the expected scenario: when a replica under the control of an adversary has state that is entirely compromised. However, one can implement more conservative strategies, in which a data block is retrieved only if it is compromised. In this case, the recovering replica will collect the digest from \( f \) other replicas first, compare this value to the digest of the same block stored locally, and then transfer the block if necessary. We extend these techniques to retrieve multiple blocks in parallel and balance the load across the other correct replicas.

Finally, note that modern database systems implement state transfer strategies (typically in a client-server or publish-subscribe manner) to maintain up-to-date consistent copies of the same database. However, these solutions are not intrusion tolerant and hence not suitable for our system.

E. Prime certificates validation

Pre-order and order certificates, combined with the state, represent the memory of the system. A pre-order certificate is composed of \( 2f + 1 \) messages: a client operation \( o \) and \( 2f \) acknowledgments with a digest of that operation. Each operation is uniquely identified by the pair \((id, seq_num)\), where \( id \) is the identifier of the replica that injected the update in the system, and \( seq_num \) is a local sequence number generated at that replica. As in other BFT protocols, an order certificate in Prime is composed of: (i) a prepare certificate, with a pre-prepare message sent by the leader and \( 2f \) prepare messages; (ii) a commit certificate, with \( 2f + 1 \) commit messages. A pre-prepare message in Prime contains a summary matrix that assigns an order to client operations, while prepare and commit messages contain a digest of that matrix. In addition, a pre-prepare message is uniquely identified by the pair \((view, i)\), where \( view \) is the current view number and \( i \) is the \( i \)th pre-prepare during that view. During Prime operations, when a certificate is ready, a correct replica saves that certificate on the disk. These messages are reloaded into main memory after rejuvenation. In particular, pre-order certificates contain the updates that a rejuvenated replica has to apply to a correct copy of the state at some checkpoint in order to catch up the same execution point as before rejuvenation, if that replica was correct. Order certificates, instead, specify in which order those updates must be applied. Because the adversary can compromise pre-order and order certificates stored on the disk, they must be validated.

1) Validation of order certificates: Order certificates are validated first, because they determine the set of updates that the rejuvenated replica expects to find during the pre-order certificate validation, and the order in which correct updates must be applied to the state.

Because the recovering replica may be missing some messages when it is rejuvenated, it is necessary to estimate the current execution point to catch up. We use the same approach as in [1]: the rejuvenated replica broadcasts a request for the sequence number of the last pre-prepare message for which each replica obtained a prepare certificate. The replica collects sequence numbers, including its own number, and selects the value \((v,p)\) such that at least \( 2f + 1 \) different replicas reported a value greater than or equal to \( p \) for view \( v \). This is necessary to ensure SAFETY if the rejuvenated replica was correct: \( p \) is guaranteed to be no smaller than the value \( p' \), proposed by the rejuvenated replica.

Verifying whether a prepare or commit certificate is valid requires the replica to decrypt the pre-prepare message, compute the digest of the summary matrix, and compare this value to the digests contained in prepare or commit messages. If the validation fails for some message, or there is a gap in the pre-prepare sequence, the rejuvenated replica sends a request to another \( f + 1 \) replicas with the sequence number and view of the compromised/missing pre-prepare. Replies include the
pre-prepare message, prepare and commit certificates. In this way we are guaranteed that at least one reply contains valid certificates. The verification process is executed for all pre-prepare messages with sequence number up to \((v, p)\).

Note that the validation of an order certificate may involve just the pre-prepare and the \(2f + 1\) commit messages, because the collection of a correct commit certificate implies that the ordering proposed by the leader has been previously accepted. However, the validation of prepare certificates is necessary to ensure that all Prime messages saved in the persistent storage are correct after rejuvenation.

2) Validation of pre-order certificates: The procedure to validate pre-order certificates is similar to the one described in the previous point. Verifying whether a pre-order certificate is valid requires the replica to compute the digest of the client operation and compare this value with digests in ack messages. Note that in Prime the complete set of update identifiers is obtained from pre-prepare messages.

If the validation fails for some message, or there is a missing update, the rejuvenated replica sends a request to another \(f + 1\) replicas with the sequence number of the compromised/missing update. Replies include the client operation and \(2f\) ack messages. In this way we are guaranteed that at least one reply contains a valid certificate. When pre-order validation completes, the correct set of updates is applied to the state. After that, the Prime replica is correct and is ready to resume Prime operations.

F. Extension to a system with \(3f + 2k + 1\) replicas

Augmenting the number of system replicas requires some minor changes to the Prime protocol. As introduced in Section III-C, the number of messages to order updates and, consequently, the certificates size change from \(2f + 1\) to \(2f + k + 1\). This is necessary because, otherwise, \(f\) malicious replicas can send different messages to two distinct sets of \(f + 1\) replicas, violating \textsc{Safety}. The proactive recovery protocol requires some minor changes.

\textbf{Key replacement}: A new session key invalidates all previous keys of the same replica when at least another \(2f + k\) replicas receive it. In this way we guarantee that Prime does not order updates signed with old keys.

\textbf{State validation}: During the state validation the recovering replica still requires \(f + 1\) replies with the same digest. Even in the case when the recovering replica has no valid checkpoint, it waits for \(2f + 1\) replies and selects the checkpoint \(c_{k^*}\) with the \((f + 1)^{th}\) highest sequence number.

\textbf{State transfer}: The strategy described in Section IV-D1 still needs \(f + 1\) copies of a data block and \(f\) digests. At most \(f\) replies, in fact, may contain invalid information, and the remaining \(f + 1\) replies are enough to find a correct copy of the block. The strategy described in Section IV-D2, including the two variants, requires no additional change.

\textbf{Certificate validation}: The size of Prime certificates increases from \(2f + 1\) to \(2f + k + 1\), while the transfer of missing/compromised certificates still requires \(f + 1\) replies.

V. Evaluation

A. System deployment

In this Section we describe the deployment of the survivable Prime system in a physical and virtualized environment.

1) Deployment in a physical environment: The deployment in a physical environment is depicted in Figure 2. The proactive recovery logic runs in a separate computer and includes the scheduler that periodically rejuvenates one replica at a time, in a round robin fashion. The computer is connected to a network switch that, in turn, connects to netbooters (i.e., remotely activated power switches), one for each physical server that hosts a Prime replica. The network that connects the computer with the proactive recovery logic, switch and netbooters is completely isolated from outside communication, and thus cannot be accessed by the attacker. Physical servers are connected to netbooters through power wires. Periodically, the proactive recovery scheduler activates one of the netbooters to cycle the power and reboot the corresponding server. After rebooting, the replica executes the proactive recovery protocol as described in the previous section.

![Deployment in a physical system, with the proactive recovery logic isolated from the external network.](image)

2) Deployment in a virtualized environment: The deployment in a virtualized environment is depicted in Figure 3, and is based on Xen Cloud Platform (XCP). The proactive recovery logic runs in the privileged Dom0 domain on a separate physical server, while Prime replicas run in Xen guest domains. XCP allows creating a resource pool: a virtualized system that can be managed from a single hypervisor, i.e. the master, which can instruct other hypervisors to execute specific operations (e.g. creating/destroying virtual machines). The proactive recovery logic runs in the master hypervisor, which communicates with other hypervisors through a private network.

The advantage of a deployment in a virtualized environment is that rejuvenation is much shorter than in a physical environment: a shadow virtual machine, in fact, can be instantiated in advance, with a clean copy of the operating system and a new version of Prime. When the shadow virtual machine is ready to start, the old one can be destroyed. We built a prototype that, as soon as the new virtual machine is ready to take over, shuts down the old virtual machine, detaches the virtual disk with the state and the virtual network interface from that machine, and attaches them to the new one. We measured the time taken to complete these operations to be approximately 8 seconds.
Note that XCP does not allow destroying a virtual machine before shutting it down; the shut down operation is what most impacts the time to transition. Finally, the old virtual machine is destroyed, while the second one can initiate the proactive recovery protocol.

The virtualized environment poses two drawbacks: (i) the server that runs proactive recovery logic can be compromised if the attacker compromises the hypervisor; (ii) a virtualized environment offers poor or no support for TPM (i.e. solutions present in literature are either not implemented or only partially implemented), which is a fundamental component in our survivable system. Regarding point (i), a deployment in a virtualized environment is suggested if one trusts the hypervisor. This can be substantiated, as an example, by rebooting physical servers from time to time and verifying the status of the servers through a chain of trust (i.e. digest of BIOS, operating system kernel, ...) computed by the TPM. Regarding point (ii), instead, we exploit the fact that Dom0 has full access to the underlying hardware to implement a TPM manager that mediates the interaction between the Prime replica in a virtual machine and the physical TPM. Each time the Prime replica has to access the TPM, it contacts the TPM manager in Dom0, which, in turn, accesses the TPM and replies back to the Prime replica with the outcome of the specific operation.

B. Experimental results

We deploy the system in a physical cluster with $3f + 1$ servers. Each server is a Dell PowerEdge R210 II, with an Intel Xeon E3 1270v2 3.50 GHz processor and 16GB of memory. All servers are connected by Solarflare 5161T 10GbE cards and an Arista 7120T-4S switch, providing 10 Gigabit Ethernet. All servers run CentOS 6.2 as the operating system. In the following we measure the time to complete state validation and transfer for different state sizes, from 1 gigabyte to 1 terabyte. The whole state is fragmented into data blocks of 1 megabyte. We transfer these blocks in parallel, 5 at a time. During the experiment, we noticed that the time to transfer the state grows linearly with the number of data blocks. The performance hit obtained in a system with 4 replicas is due to the fact that some replicas are sending more data blocks at the same time, which produces a higher CPU consumption that limits the processing speed of the physical servers that host those replicas.

Based on the obtained results, in Section VI we will show how to set the rejuvenation rate in our theoretical model. The model will output the minimum security requirement that a replica has to guarantee in order to achieve a desired confidence in the system over its lifetime.

### VI. Theoretical Rejuvenation Model

In this section we present a theoretical model that allows a system administrator to determine the deployment parameters needed to reach the desired confidence in the system.

As a building block, we present an equation that computes the resiliency of the system based on the rejuvenation rate and the number of replicas. The equation takes as input: (i) the probability $c$ that a replica is correct over a year; (ii) the rejuvenation rate $r$, i.e. the number of rejuvenations per day across the whole system, which is limited by the system’s state size; (iii) the number of replicas $n$; and (iv) the system lifetime $y$. A system administrator has control of $r$ and $n$, but he does not have control of $c$, which represents the strength of a replica. The strength of a replica can be estimated with CERT alerts, bug reports, or other historical information, as in [17]. The output of the computation is the probability the system will remain correct over its lifetime.

By iterating this computation many times with different possible values of $r$ and $n$, the system administrator can determine the replica strength required to reach the desired confidence in the system. Alternatively, if the replica strength is fixed, the same computation can be iterated to find the required values of $r$ and $n$ to reach the desired confidence.

A. Model description

In our model we consider only failures related to software aspects, not hardware failures. We assume that every replica has the same probability of being compromised over a year. In

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>state size</th>
<th>state reading</th>
<th>state transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Gb</td>
<td>9 sec</td>
<td>4 replicas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Gb</td>
<td>1 m, 27 sec</td>
<td>7 replicas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 Gb</td>
<td>5 m, 47 sec</td>
<td>10 replicas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80 Gb</td>
<td>11 m, 30 sec</td>
<td>7 replicas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120 Gb</td>
<td>17 m, 15 sec</td>
<td>25 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240 Gb</td>
<td>34 m, 30 sec</td>
<td>48 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>520 Gb</td>
<td>1 h, 14 m</td>
<td>1 h, 38 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Tb</td>
<td>2 h, 24 m</td>
<td>6 h, 17 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
addition, we assume that each replica fails independently. We support this assumption by making extensive use of diversity as explained before. Replicas are periodically rejuvenated one at a time in a round robin fashion. For simplicity’s sake we pessimistically assume that recovery is instantaneous. However, in Section VI-C we extend this model to relax this assumption at the cost of an additional 2k replicas in the computation and pessimistically assume that a recovery operation spans over an entire rejuvenation cycle.

In order to compute the probability the system is correct over its lifetime, we first define $p$ as the probability that a replica is correct at the end of an inter-rejuvenation period by simply scaling the probability $c$ to the appropriate time interval: $p = \frac{365}{\sqrt{r}}$. The following equation then gives the probability the system will survive over a lifetime of $y$ years.

$$
\sum_{i=n+1-f}^{n+1} \text{coeff} \left( \prod_{j=1}^{n} \left( (1 - p^j) + p^j x \right) \right) [i]^{y \cdot 365 \cdot r}
$$

The innermost part of the equation is a product of the form $\prod_{j=1}^{n} \left( (1 - p^j) + p^j x \right)$. Each term of this product corresponds to one replica, where $p^j$ is the probability that the replica will remain correct to the end of the current rejuvenation round and $1 - p^j$ is the probability that the replica will be compromised at the end of current rejuvenation round. This is because that replica has not been rejuvenated for the last $j - 1$ rounds and must have survived all of them in addition to the current round in order to remain correct at the end of the current round. By taking the product of these terms, the $i^{th}$ coefficient in the resulting polynomial is formed by the sum of all possible combinations of the $p^j x$ components of $i$ of the terms with the $(1 - p^j)$ components of the remaining $n - i$ terms. Thus, the $i^{th}$ coefficient represents the probability that exactly $i$ replicas will remain correct at the end of the current rejuvenation round.

We sum these probabilities for all the cases when the system would survive the round, i.e. the coefficients of the polynomial from the $(n + 1 - f)^{th}$ coefficient to the $(n + 1)^{th}$ coefficient. This excludes any cases when more than $f$ replicas have failed. This sum then gives the probability that the system will survive one rejuvenation round.

In fact, there are many rejuvenation rounds in the system’s lifetime, which can be treated as a repeated experiment. In order for the system to succeed for its entire lifetime, it must succeed for every rejuvenation round in its lifetime. The probability of success, then, is the product of the probabilities of success for all the rejuvenations rounds, here represented as the exponent $30 \cdot 365 \cdot r$, to capture the $y$ year lifetime, 365 days per year, and $r$ rejuvenations per day.

B. Application to realistic scenarios

Let us apply the model to a concrete example based on the measured time to complete state transfer reported in Section V, Table I. Figure 4(a) shows the required strength of a replica to achieve a confidence in the system of 95% over 30 years when varying the number $r$ of rejuvenations per day and the state size. The time to transfer the state determines the maximum rejuvenation rate possible for each state size. In the presence of large state, some of the configurations are not possible.

As an example, we cannot have $r > 2$ when the state size is 1 terabyte, because the total time to validate and transfer that state is 8 hours and 41 minutes. Figure 4(a) shows that increasing $r$, when possible, helps the system to work correctly in the presence of weak replicas.

In Figure 4(b) we vary the rejuvenation rate $r$, for different numbers of tolerated failures $f$. We assume the state size is large enough to allow multiple rejuvenations per day (e.g. 1, 10, or 40 gigabytes). Augmenting the number of replicas allows the system to survive in the presence of weaker replicas, but the benefit of adding replicas decreases as $f$ increases.

The results presented in this section show that proactive recovery is possible in the presence of large state. Some papers in the literature [1], [5] use an aggressive rejuvenation rate (one rejuvenation every 5, 10, or 15 minutes), but these rates limit the size of the state to transfer and incur unnecessary overhead. Our model shows that a rejuvenation rate of one replica per day requires a replica strength of 0.54 when the state size is 1 terabyte. In addition, our model helps to determine the number of replicas to deploy. Many BFT protocols in literature are evaluated with 4 replicas. The model
shows that a system with 4 replicas requires stronger replicas, even in the presence of multiple rejuvenations per day. At the same time, deploying systems with more than 10 replicas does not increase the resiliency of the system remarkably, and it generates additional overhead in the BFT protocol.

C. Extension to a system with $3f + 2k + 1$ replicas

So far, the model has assumed that rejuvenations occur instantaneously. Since the system has state, which takes time to verify or transfer, rejuvenations actually take some time to complete. In this section, we extend the model by conservatively assuming that each rejuvenation takes an entire rejuvenation round to complete.

A system with $3f + 2k + 1$ replicas can tolerate $f$ Byzantine faults and $k$ benign faults simultaneously, as previously shown in [5]. The changes to the protocol necessary to support the additional $2k$ replicas are specified in Section IV-F. Since each rejuvenating replica behaves as a replica experiencing a benign fault until it finishes its rejuvenation, we choose $k$ to be 1, reflecting the fact that we rejuvenate one replica at a time. Then, the system is able to tolerate $f$ Byzantine failures while rejuvenating some other correct replica without sacrificing availability.

To extend our model from $3f + 1$ to $3f + 2k + 1$, we change the value of $n$ accordingly. The equation in the model is unchanged.

We now show the results of the same analysis as in the previous section, but with this extended model. The salient difference here is that we seek a 95% confidence that the system will remain correct and available for 30 years, when in the previous section we sought a 95% confidence that the system will remain correct but not always available for 30 years.

The results of this new analysis are shown in Figures 5(a) and 5(b). Note that the curves with $k = 0$ in Figure 5(b) represent the same system configuration as reported in Figure 4(b). Compared to Figures 4(a) and 4(b), in Figures 5(a) and 5(b) we note an increased required strength of a replica to achieve the desired confidence in the system over its lifetime. This increase is driven by the $2k$ additional replicas in the system, required to maintain both correctness and availability, while the number of tolerated faults still remains the same as in the case of $3f + 1$ replicas. However, Figure 5(b) shows that this difference decreases as we increase the number of tolerated faults, $f$.

VII. RELATED WORK

A. Proactive rejuvenation

Software rejuvenation [18] was introduced to increase the reliability and availability of continuously running applications in order to prevent failures over time due to software aging. Both [18], [19] formulate the rejuvenation model through a Markov chain and derive the optimal rejuvenation schedule.

More recently, software rejuvenation has been used to proactively recover replicas in a malicious environment. Castro in [1] was the first to present a proactive recovery protocol for BFT systems, addressing issues such as the need for unforgeable cryptographic material, rebooting from read-only memory, and efficient state transfer. In our paper we extend the work in [1] by describing how to obtain fine-grain diversity and efficient state transfer in the presence of a large state.

Rodrigues et al. in [7] present BASE, which extends the BFT protocol described in [20] with data abstraction techniques in order to mask software errors. The abstraction layer hides implementation details and allows the reuse of off-the-shelf software components. Replicas are periodically rejuvenated, rebooting from a clean state. Authors in [21] propose splitting the system into a synchronous component that activates periodic rejuvenation and an any-asynchronous subsystem that includes the payload application. This model has been adopted later in other papers [5], [6], [22], [23]. In particular, authors in [5] enhance proactive rejuvenation with reactive recovery, which allows the recovery of replicas as soon as they are detected or suspected of being compromised. The proposed solution guarantees the availability of the minimum number of replicas required to make progress by using $2k$ additional replicas, where $k$ is the maximum number of replicas that recover at the same time. In our paper we also describe how to adapt our protocol to work with $3f + 2k + 1$ replicas, and separate the proactive recovery
logic from the replication engine. However, in contrast to [5] we avoid any direct interaction between these two modules because the bidirectional communication between the trusted proactive recovery logic and the untrusted application could open the possibility for potential attacks.

Theoretical models for proactive recovery have been presented in [11] and [24]. The paper in [11] compares different system configurations under parallel attacks (multiple healthy replicas are attacked at the same time) and serial attacks (only a single healthy replica is attacked at a time). That theoretical model computes the system availability, defined as $f$, by varying the time $\delta$ between rejuvenations of different replicas. Specifically, the model computes the system availability in the presence of parallel ($\delta = 0$) and serial ($\delta > 0$) rejuvenation schemes. [24] instead presents a theoretical assessment of FOREVER, a service that enhances the resiliency of intrusion-tolerant replicated systems through recovery and diversity, which is implemented through operating systems and configuration diversity rules. The theoretical model evaluates the system failure probability by varying the rejuvenation rate. The authors also consider the probability of common vulnerabilities in their model. In our work we concentrate on serial rejuvenations and do not consider the common vulnerabilities among replicas due to the high entropy among variants generated by the MultiCompiler. In addition, we define the rejuvenation rate taking into account the size of the state that may need to be transferred and the time to transfer it, while the models in [11] and [24] are designed for stateless systems.

The closest work to ours is presented by Schneider et al. in [4]. The paper presents proactive obfuscation, a method that uses semantic-preserving code transformations to create replicas that are likely to share few vulnerabilities. The proposed solution relies on a component trusted to periodically initiate proactive obfuscation (as in our system), during which one replica at a time reboots from a fresh copy of the application code and a clean copy of the state is obtained from other replicas through an internal service network. This approach is used to implement two prototypes: a distributed firewall and a distributed storage service, both with small state size (few hundreds kilobytes) and arbitrary rejuvenation rate (on the order of minutes). In our work instead we augment the built-in operating system tools with a compiler-based diversification engine and support large-state applications.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that our solution is built on Prime [8], which guarantees performance under attacks. However, recently other BFT protocols with performance guarantees have been presented. Aardvark [25] guarantees that over sufficiently long periods the system throughput remains within a constant factor of what it would be if only correct replicas were participating in the protocol. BFT-Mencius [26], like Prime, ensures bounded-delay in a period of network stability. In addition, the protocol reduces the cost of the pre-ordering phase by using a multi-leader approach, in which replicas propose an order through an atomic broadcast primitive.

B. State transfer

State transfer for BFT protocols has been previously presented in [1]. However, the proposed approach is designed for a small state (few hundreds of kilobytes), and hence it is not suitable for the kind of system that we target. The state is organized as a tree of digests and is always retrieved from the latest checkpoint. If the system makes progress to the next checkpoint before a rejuvenated replica completes state transfer, that replica must restart state transfer. In a system with large state this would generate a cascade of state transfer executions that would not end until another $f$ replicas fail/rejuvenate. At that time the recovering replica can finally catch up, at the cost of a period of service unavailability.

Authors in [6] present two state transfer strategies that are specifically tailored for a virtualized environment, exploiting the fact that more virtual replicas can share the same physical hardware. The work in [23] speeds up proactive recovery by rejuvenating several replicas at the same time and restarting the execution from a previously saved correct state.

A collaborative state transfer protocol based on sequential checkpointing has been presented in [27]. Replicas checkpoint their state at different points of execution, in groups of at most $f$ replicas each, in order to minimize the performance impact of taking a snapshot. The state of a replica consists of a checkpoint and a log file with all operations executed between two consecutive checkpoints at that replica. The log file is composed of many segments. During collaborative state transfer, the recovering replica retrieves the checkpoint and all log segments from the replica with the $f + 1^{th}$ most recent checkpoint, while the first $f$ replicas provide a digest of segments and checkpoint. The proposed approach is effective against the performance degradation generated by the typical checkpointing mechanisms. However, while the solution in [27] is very efficient for transferring a large log, in this paper we are more interested in transferring a large checkpoint.

VIII. Conclusion

The increasing reliance on critical systems necessitates the construction of systems that are able to tolerate intrusions. In this paper we presented the first practical survivable intrusion tolerant replication system, which offers defense across space (diversity) and time (proactive recovery). The innovative aspects of our work include: (i) the support for large state applications, with two state transfer strategies that can be used if the state is compromised; (ii) a theoretical model that computes how resilient the system is over its lifetime; and (iii) the use of low-level diversity to generate perpetually different copies of system replicas. We ran state transfer for different state sizes and measured the maximum rejuvenation rate and the minimum strength of a replica required to achieve high confidence in the system (e.g. 95%) over 30 years.

REFERENCES


